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I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereinafter "Telecommu-
nications Act" or merely "the Act")I proposes to establish a system in
which competition sets price and quality standards for a broad indus-
try including telephone services. Presently, issues extraneous to com-
petition arise out of a context of state or federal regulation or out of
the market power of firms in the industry. In the future anticipated
under the Act, such issues will be minimized. Most of the regulation
is designed to end and steps are provided to ensure the establishment
of competitive markets. In those markets, as in the rest of the econ-
omy, antitrust rather than direct governmental management is to en-
sure proper functioning. This article examines the meaning of
antitrust ordering in the context of the Act.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS Acr oF 1996
The synopsis announces the purpose of the Act: "to promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers
and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications tech-
nologies."2 The Act sets a national policy framework for opening
telecommunications markets to competition. 3 It is expected that high
quality voice, data, image, graphic, and video telecommunications
services will result. International competitiveness should markedly
improve. Mixed with these apparently procompetitive goals, are goals
of achieving affordable service, spurring economic growth, creating
jobs, and increasing productivity.4 An economic optimist might find
these further goals merely a reflection of the sorts of benefits a com-
petitive market would naturally produce - although efficiency might
instead decrease the number of jobs.5 Finally, the goals include deliv-
ery of a better quality of life through the preservation and advance-
ment of universal service to allow more efficient delivery of
educational, health care, and other social services.6 These aims, while
laudable, cannot easily be linked to freeing telecommunications from
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56-
110.
2. Id.
3. See id. at 70-71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253).
4. See id. at 71-72 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254).
5. Of late there have been substantial layoffs as telephone companies plan for the advent
of deregulation. William I. Cook & Kaha Hetter, Hanging Up on Workers, U.S. News &
WoRLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 50.
6. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 71-72 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254
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regulation. Indeed, providing universal service may only be accom-
plished by governmental insistence since the costs of including the
most geographically remote and economically impoverished persons
may be quite unprofitable. As the Act expresses the goals in opera-
tional terms, it becomes clear that universal service is to be provided,
if the market does not meet the need, by a return to regulation.7
While the Act deals with many forms of communications, includ-
ing cable services and broadcast services, the core of the Telecommu-
nications Act is the deregulation of telephone-based services, which
comprise the best developed and most regulated services in the eco-
nomic (as opposed to political) sense. Consequently, only telephone-
based services will be considered in this article. To some extent the
other forms of telecommunications have an effect on telephone serv-
ices. After a history of forced separation from each other, cable serv-
ices and telephone services are designed to become potential
competitors for each others' markets. The use of telephone lines to
supply the content presently sold by cable companies seems well ad-
vanced; the application of cable to telephone uses does not, although
not much more than an efficient switching mechanism for cable lines
would be required. As technology evolves, the forms of communica-
tion governed by the Act will become more interchangeable, but the
problems of the short run will set the competitive climate. These more
immediate problems are the exclusive focus of this article.
The Act recognizes that local telephone service is predominantly
a monopoly service and that the offspring of the government's AT&T
divestiture, the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), colloquially
known as "Baby Bells," were created as monopolies of local service in
a regulated framework.' (States regulated the BOCs, and through that
regulation and through some provisions of federal law, states retained
considerable authority over local rates and service.9) The Act is
designed to deregulate local services as well. In order to accomplish
that end, it is necessary to consider the continuing need for state au-
thority to enforce universal service requirements and their relation-
ships with the BOCs. Although all forms of regulation are designed to
be transitory, states will be important participants in interim regula-
tion. Independently, the power of the BOCs is a force to be consid-
ered. With an eye to a deregulated future, the Act proposes to allow
7. It would not be the only portion of the Act blatantly regulatory. The Act also estab-
lishes far-reaching regulations of sexual expression. See id at 136 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 641).
8. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1233 (D.D.C. 1992).
9. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
sub non. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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the BOCs' entry into nonlocal, interlata service.' 0 Their present
prominent position poses problems, and the Act limits their access to
competitive markets until their monopoly power is neutralized." I Pro-
fessor Sullivan argues the BOCs should be dropped from inter-
exchange service altogether. 2
In most respects, the Telecommunications Act proposes immedi-
ately to substitute competition in telephone service and among various
forms of telecommunications services for the need to regulate. Thus,
when fully implemented, the Act may eliminate most bases for con-
cern about rate regulation. The Act, however, anticipates that there
will be a role for both the federal government and the states in guaran-
teeing sufficiency of service to customers of modest means and those
who live in rural and remote areas of the country.' Also, certain pro-
visions regulate the phasing in of competition by imposing constraints
on presently powerful companies in the companies' evolution to local
competitive status.' 4
In instances in which service would otherwise be inadequate, the
Act provides for state creation of new utilities called "eligible tele-
communication carriers."' 5 Those so designated are obliged, at the
risk of financial sanctions, to serve designated customers at appropri-
ate prices.16 States are also free to create additional eligible telecom-
munication carriers, even carriers with overlapping areas of service. 7
Monopoly local service should become competitive service
through a process of contracting between existing carriers and inter-
ested entrants. The law imposes many obligations of fair dealing on
existing carriers and charges them to negotiate in good faith to divest
themselves of their exclusivity.' 8 It occurred to Congress that not all
local carriers would eagerly undertake their charge. Consequently, the
10. The local service areas are designated local access and transport area (LATA). (Within
the state there may be multiple LATA's and, consequently, service among them - inter-LATA
service.) See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983).
11. Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 1, at 86 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 271).
12. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Elusive Goals Under the Telecommunications Act: Preserv-
ing Long Distance Competition Upon Baby Bell Entry and Attaining Local Exchange Competi-
tion: We'll Not Preserve the One Unless We Attain the Other, 6-7 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal).
13. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 64-65 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(f)).
14. See, e.g., id. at 86 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271).
15. Id. at 80 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)).
16. Id.
17. Id (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2)).
18. Id at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1)).
230 (Vol. 12
ANTITRUST AND THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
states' Commissions are given authority to assist in the negotiations, 19
to act as arbitrator of problems, and finally to be intervenors in the
process if it stalls.20 States continue to control the rates charged by
eligible telecommunications carriers.21 States are also obliged to in-
sure that telephone service not exclude areas more costly to serve, and
Commissions "shall determine which common carrier or carriers are
best able to provide such service to the requesting unserved commu-
nity or portion thereof and shall order such carrier or carriers to pro-
vide such service."2 2 In another section, the Act preserves state
regulatory authority to protect the public safety and welfare, ensure
the continued quality of services and safeguard consumers - all tradi-
tional state functions.23 In all of these respects, states will (for a year
and subject to FCC review) be able to make decisions that could bur-
den newcomers who had not been involved in local service and who
might be less well-known or popular with state regulators.
H. NONCOMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF THE ACT AND OF TELEPHONE
SERVICE IN GENERAL
Even if one were to take the future contemplated by the Act as
certain, more problems are likely to arise in the implementation stages
of the law as the presently common tensions of federalism, and be-
tween government and industry, continue to intrude on the competi-
tive model. A cursory examination of the law demonstrates that,
however pure the competitive concept may once have been, specific
provisions are now designed to accomplish noncompetitive objectives
and some of the objectives are inconsistent with the competitive
model. Thus, there is likely to be a number of problems interfering
with the competitive approach proposed. This article examines the
role antitrust will play in resolving those problems.
Telephone service has been a product of antitrust for many years.
For most of this century, the market for telephone service was domi-
19. 1l at 66 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(2)).
20. Id. at 66-67 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)).
21. Id. at 67-68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)).
22. Id, at 80 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(3)).
23. Id at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(b)).
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a competi-
tively neutral basis and consistent with section 254, requirements necessary to
preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, en-
sure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the
rights of consumers.
Id. § 253(b).
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nated by AT&T.2' The phone company served both local areas and
the domestic long distance market.25 To a limited extent, phone ser-
vice was regulated by the federal government through earlier versions
of the Communications Act.26 States regulated intrastate phone ser-
vice in roughly the same manner in which they regulate other utilities.
The combination of regulation did little to avoid some of the problems
of monopoly power. As a result, telephones used in the United States
did not evolve significantly.2 7 The equipment and options opened to
consumers seem quite modest compared with what has been made
available since the AT&T breakup. More importantly, with control of
phone lines, AT&T suppressed the development of the entire commu-
nications industry.2 8
A. United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Company 29
In 1978 the Justice Department brought suit under the antimono-
polizing provision of the Sherman Act30 and four years later won a
consent decree.3 1 In the decree the local service of the telephone com-
pany was divested to a number of BOCs and some other companies.
AT&T and the new Baby Bells remained subject to the jurisdiction of
the federal district court, which balanced their impact by modifying
the decree from time to time.32 Antitrust law had been used in its
usual manner to break up the telephone system. However, the result
of this case was unique in the annals of antitrust in that the Justice
Department and the District Court judge, Judge Green, used the decree
and its modifications as a means of re-regulating a portion of the in-
dustry that antitrust had theoretically freed from improper
regulation.33
24. Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global Information Super-
highway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 275, 280-81 (1995).
25. Id at 280.
26. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988)).
27. Gotts & Rutenberg, supra note 24, at 280-81.
28. id. at 285.
29. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
31. 552 F. Supp. 131.
32. Id. at 143. In light of the Act, the Justice Department has now filed a request to cancel
the decree. Division Seeks Termination of Consent Decrees Against AT&T. 70 ANTrrRusT &
TRADF REG. REP. 256 (1996).
33. 552 F. Supp. 131.
232 [Vol. 12
ANTITRUST AND THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
After considerable dissatisfaction with the status quo in telephone
regulation and in a generally deregulatory mood, both houses of Con-
gress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996.14
The Act finds that: "Competitive communications markets, safe-
guarded by effective Federal and State antitrust enforcement, and
strong economic growth in the United States which such markets fos-
ter are the most effective means of assuring that all segments of the
American public command access to advanced telecommunications
technologies."35 Section 601(b) provides: "Except as provided in
paragraphs (2) and (3), nothing in this Act or the amendments made
by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the ap-
plicability of any of the antitrust laws."36 Section 601(a) of the Act
makes exceptions, but only for the Act's provisions that alter further
administration of the court's telecommunications decrees. 37
B. Disclosures to Competitors
Despite the strong indications of reliance on antitrust, the Act
contains a number of regulatory provisions either not directly consis-
tent with antitrust or, in some cases, inconsistent with the competitive
premises of antitrust law. For example, Bell Operating Companies are
required to assist competitors by timely disclosures of new technology
and implementation plans.38 Even monopolists are not required by
antitrust law to disclose new technology. 9 Nonmonopolists might vi-
olate Section 1 of the Sherman Act4" by discussing future plans with
competitors because such conversations could be tantamount to estab-
lishing market division with competitors41 and could be tantamount, in
concentrated markets, to a preliminary step in price fixing.42 Under
other provisions, states are allowed to issue orders to accomplish ser-
vice objectives that contravene competitive norms. Outside regulated
industries, no one is allowed to direct desired outcomes; outcomes are
34. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 passed in the Senate on June 15, 1995 (141
CoNG. REc. S8480) and passed in the House of Representatives on July 14, 1995. It was signed
by the President on February 8, 1996.
35. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(8) (1995).
36. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 143 (to be codified at'47 U.S.C.
§ 601(b)(1)).
37. Id (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 601(a)).
38. Id. at 95 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273(c)).
39. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
41. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
42. Cf. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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supposed to follow from market forces.43 The Federal Communica-
tions Commission is directed to supervise and, in some cases, to over-
ride state orders. It is difficult to predict the extent to which the FCC
is free to ignore antitrust, given express provisions invoking antitrust
and the absence of provisions providing immunity. The Commission
itself cannot be an antitrust defendant;" it is not clear, however,
whether those under the Commissioner can be sued in antitrust and
forced to conduct themselves in a manner opposite from what the
Commission desired.45
For example, consider the new section 65246 which, among other
provisions, bars acquisitions, joint ventures, partnerships, and joint use
of facilities for local telephone exchange carriers wishing to acquire
more than ten percent of a cable operator in the same area.47 It later
provides an exemption for rural systems,48 and then allows the Com-
mission to waive the restrictions altogether under certain circum-
stances.49 The most open ended of these circumstances is if "the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly out-
weighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served.''50 The law indicates that these provisions (and others) do not
affect the antitrust laws.5'
Anticipating that the goals of universal service may well not re-
sult from a competitive distribution of telephone companies, the Act
creates the status of "eligible telecommunications carrier."5 2 While
the designation appears laudatory, it actually carries with it the usual
indicia of utility regulation. The carrier must provide universal ser-
vice at an approved price and can only relinquish the designation by
permission.5 3 One of the benefits of becoming an eligible telecommu-
nications carrier is the requirement that other carriers make available
"such public switched network infrastructure, technology, informa-
43. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
44. Government agencies do not prosecute the organs of government but rather those re-
sponsible for administering them.
45. See infra text accompanying note 123.
46. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 119-21 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652)).
47. Id
48. Id at 120 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(d)). It exemptsplaces with under 35,000
inhabitants. Id.
49. One cause for waiver is that the incumbent cable operator or local exchange carrier
would be subjected to "undue economic distress." Id. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 652(d)(6)). Another is that the system would not be economically viable. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 143 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 601(b)).
52. Id. at 80-81 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)).
53. Id at 81 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(4)).
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tion, and telecommunications facilities and functions" at reasonable
prices.54
On the other hand, states are strictly limited in interfering with
the growth of competition. In a key section, the Act provides: "No
State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal require-
ment, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any
entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications serv-
ices." 55  It also empowers the Commission to preempt any such law.56
This key provision regarding the "removal of barriers to entry" 57
is probably the broadest provision in support of antitrust in the Act. It
can be read to remove the state action exemption in antitrust58 to the
extent that state acts would legitimate barriers such as refusals of per-
mits, fees that a carrier would find difficult to pay, administrative bar-
riers based on concerns about adequate local coverage of service or
zoning considerations. In other words, section 253 appears to override
all local concern other than facilitating telecommunications service. It
is difficult to reconcile section 253 with provisions that the state set
requirements for universal service, "protect the public safety and wel-
fare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and
safeguard the rights of consumers. '5 9 All of those concerns appear to
require, or at least allow, management decisions to substitute for mar-
ket place determinations. Whatever the effect on state action, one
would assume an even harsher rejection of state authorized local ac-
tion. It is not indicated whether the ability of the FCC to preempt state
acts prevents them from becoming the basis for antitrust suits against
participants.
54. Section 259(a) provides:
The Commission shall prescribe, within one year after the date of enactment of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, regulations that require incumbent local
exchange carriers (as defined in section 251(h)) to make available to any qualify-
ing carrier such public switched network infrastructure, technology, information,
and telecommunications facilities and functions as may be requested by such
qualifying carrier for the purpose of enabling such qualifying carrier to provide
telecommunications services, or to provide access to information services, in the
service area in which such qualifying carrier has requested and obtained designa-
tion as an eligible telecommunications carrier under section 214(e).
Id. at 77-78 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 259).
55. Id. at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
56. Id at 70-71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(d)).
57. Id. at 70-71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253).
58. A state, its officers, and its agents, are immune from antitrust law. Parker v. Brown,
317 u.W. 341, 350 (1943). See infra text accompanying notes 123-28.
59. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 253(b)).
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C. Interconnection Among Telecommunication Carriers
As the Act is designed to substitute competition for regulation in
all phases of telecommunications, it is interesting to note the obliga-
tion of interconnection among carriers. The state is given a significant
role in the process. It may be requested by either party to participate
in the negotiations and to arbitrate differences." Failure to cooperate
with the state as arbitrator is a failure to negotiate in good faith.61 The
concept of bargaining "in good faith" is not new to this Act. Whether
its labor law antecedents62 quite apply to the current problem is not
clear to the writer. In labor law, there is some public interest in keep-
ing the parties in contact as opposed to in the streets. However, the
interest here is principally in achieving an appropriate result - to
which the continued attendance of the parties may not be as relevant.
1. Rural Services
There follows a right to provide an exemption for rural carriers.6"
This concern is expressly left to the states.' It may signal the reten-
tion of some practices under present law that are highly inefficient and
anything but competitive. The Wall Street Journal recently recounted
some problems with rural phone subsidies. 65 Since rural subsidies are
now given to the smaller companies, sometimes on the basis of their
comparative costs, there has been an incentive to spend funds. That
may have provided advantages to smaller customers.66 Often rural
service serves the affluent rather than the poor.67 Large companies
subsidize the required rural service by charging their other customers.
Smaller ones draw from a federal fund collected from larger carriers
for that purpose.68 This system puts a premium on smallness and inef-
60. Id. at 66 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)).
61. IM.
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71
HARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
63. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 64-65 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(0).
64. Id
65. Daniel Pearl, Good Connections: Despite Deregulation, Rural Phone Subsidies Are
Likely to Survive, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1995, at Al.
66. Id. The Journal gave the following examples: Beehive Telephone Company, in West-
over, near Partoun, Utah, has a modem system that "enables 40 student West Desert High to
install a two way educational TV system. It lets accountant Dean Howard hook up his computer
to Salt Lake City. And rancher Linda Bronson pays only $15.85 a month for basic phone service
that includes automatic redialing of a busy number." It may run lines to summer homes in Zion
Park at a cost of $430,000. Id.
67. Id.
68. Following the AT&T breakup, the FCC set up the National Exchange Carriers Associ-
ation, which collects fees from long distance carriers and sends monthly checks to local ones. Id.
Companies benefit by showing costs at least 15% over national costs and those with fewer than
[Vol. 12
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ficiency. Some large companies have pocket subsidies but the con-
ventional wisdom is for them to sell the companies to rural carriers
better able to extract subsidies. 9 In terms of the economic incentives
the Act is designed to promote, prior practices point in the wrong di-
rection. Not only do they distort costs but they also distort the choice
of carrier.
Rural service is not handled much better under the Act. The Act
generally favors efficient carriers, which are usually of substantial
size. The rural service requirements seem to build in many of the
present problems. Under the Act the vehicle for assuring rural service
is state guidance. States are allowed to achieve proper rural service by
exempting carriers from burdens that prevent their serving rural popu-
lations.70 The Act allows such exemption for reasons of unfair com-
petition, adverse economic impact on users, technical infeasibility, or
broadly considerations of the public interest. 71 The present system is
an example of political stasis. It would almost seem that the Act, in its
richness of goals, leaves'states free to arrive at a similar compromise.
What does public interest mean in this context? What sort of eco-
nomic impact on users does the bill incorporate? What considerations
of technical infeasibility is a state better able to adjust than the market
place would? Are different states free to apply their own philosophy
and how will that affect the information highway?
Further, the Act provides that:
Nothing in this part precludes a State from imposing requirements
on a telecommunications carrier for intrastate services that are nec-
essary to further competition in the provision of telephone ex-
change service or exchange access, as long as the State's
requirements are not inconsistent with this part or the Commis-
sion's regulations to implement this part.72
50,000 customers get more money regardless of costs. Id On the other hand, while cable com-
panies are thought of as potential competitors which will drive down the cost of telephone ser-
vice elsewhere, the House version expressly forbids cable connection to telephone service in
small cities. Id. The matter is highly charged politically. The primary organization of smaller
companies is The Organization for the Protection and Advancement of Small Telephone Compa-
nies. Md It estimates that the cost of their services would rise 72% without the subsidies. Id
While they make the claim in the name of poor people who would otherwise be without service,
they oppose direct subsidy to the poor. Id
69. Reportedly, the FCC is becoming concerned about the incentive structure it has created
and is considering substituting a schedule that expressly evaluates the factors that lead to higher
costs for rural service, for example annual rainfall or the nature of the terrain, and simply reim-
bursing the costs associated with them. IM.
70. Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note I, at 64 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
251(f)).
71. Id
72. Id at 79 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 261(c)).
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In antitrust, there is a longstanding debate on the meaning of the stat-
utes' ubiquitous goal of "competition."73 On the one hand, it has been
interpreted to mean protection of the process that maximizes consumer
welfare irrespective of its costs to those who are in business. On the
other, it has been interpreted to mean preserving small business, thus
allowing the maximum numbers to be in "competition" with each
other. The two goals are often inconsistent.74 It would seem that
''competition" in this section is defined as protecting competitors,
rather than fostering efficiency, though the general construction of the
statute would lead one to conclude that efficiency was its intended
goal.
Rural service is not the only consideration that elicits provisions
seeming to subordinate efficiency to other political goals. While there
is strong language to protect all companies who wish to be carriers
and states are expressly forbidden to prevent any proposed carrier's
entry into service in the state, the state may condition the right to entry
on a commitment to provide universal service, "protect the public
safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunication
service, and safeguard the rights of consumers."' '75 While the rural ser-
vice provisions use of "competition" may have adopted the surprising
alternative meaning of the word, the use of "competition" in this con-
text is truly enigmatic. Do the listed provisions never require the
choice of one carrier over another? If such a choice is required in the
name of public safety (for example, one company has trucks more
appropriate to the terrain of the locale), how can that choice be made
competitively neutral for the other carrier(s)? One can hardly limit the
choices that might be appropriate when considering the public wel-
fare.76 Again, how can such choices possibly be competitively neu-
tral? Can choices made to accommodate quality of service or to
protect the rights of consumers (whatever they may be) be less strain-
ing of neutrality? A state could provide a version of neutrality by
73. See generally, ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANrrrRusT PARADox: A PoLICY AT WAR wrrH
ITSELF (1978).
74. See Chief Justice Warren's pronouncement in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294,344 (1962) ("It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot
fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition, through the protection of viable,
small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices
might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these com-
peting considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.").
75. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 253(b)).
76. One might note that the Constitution limits congressional spending to providing for the
general welfare. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. If the definition of "welfare" incudes all things for
which Congress spends money, it is perhaps even difficult to find goals that are not in the public
welfare.
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adopting a descriptive rule under which any carrier could theoretically
qualify. For example, instead of choosing the carrier with trucks bet-
ter adapted to the terrain, states could require the use of such trucks; in
many cases, no other carrier would bother to make the required
purchases fearing that it would simply find itself outside still another
newly drafted rule.
2. Universal Service
Universal service is another goal of the legislation which, like
rural service, has not been made consistent with the free market thrust
of the Act. The Act gives the states control of accounting rules to
ensure that universal service not bear more of its share of common
costs and expressly prohibits subsidy of competitive services. 77 The
state's power to adopt regulations is expressly subordinated to the
Commission.78 The Act invades carrier rate making or policy setting
to regulate an outcome. In the process, it cannot help but distort the
deregulation heralded by the law. If universal service is a public goal,
and it will not be served without subsidy, some form of state or federal
action is required. One alternative form of action would be to have
the government tax to provide a compensating subsidy for those the
market would not reach without it. The tax could be levied on all
telephone carriers, on home owners, or on the general public without
diluting the allocative efficiencies of market pricing. Instead, the Act
provides for the designation of eligible telecommunications carriers
who have a utility role in providing necessary services when other
carriers do not provide them.7 9
The state is also given authority to see to several matters of state
and local interest during the conversion from regulation to competi-
tion. It is given a significant role in the process. It may be requested
by either party to participate in the negotiations for transfer of assets
required for service and to arbitrate differences.80 Failure to cooperate
with the state as arbitrator is a failure to negotiate in good faith."1
Whether or not the concepts of negotiating in good faith works in a
labor context, it here is asked to accommodate at least the two equally
important interests of labor and management, neither of which is sup-
posed to be subordinated. Here, all that the negotiations are designed
to do is insure that properties that are made available by the statute are
77. Telecommunications Act. supra note 1, at 75 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(k)).
78. Id. at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(0).
79. 1l at 80-81 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)).
80. I at 66-67 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252 (b)).
81. Id.
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fairly valued. Surely that can be accomplished by a less subjective
process than bargaining in good faith and can be administerdd by a
less interested party than the state. If the idea is to require transfer of
assets when assets seem necessary to states, would not a valuation
procedure such as the one in eminent domain suffice?
The Act leaves to the states the pricing of universal service 82 as
well as the extent of the contribution from other carriers to support the
provider of universal service.8" States and the Commission are ex-
pressly charged to ensure that rates for telephone service are "just,
reasonable, and affordable." 4 No concern seems to be expressed for
the fact that the goals may well be incompatible. How should the state
define affordable? What if, even with ample competition, costs would
keep rates above what the state considers affordable? If insufficient
competition exists, the Commission or a State may establish the rate
that a carrier may charge to ensure fair rates.85
D. The Role of the BOCs and the Affiliates
Perhaps the most difficult matter to adjust to the goals of the Act
is the role that the BOCs are to play in the future of telecommunica-
tions. The consent decree86 created them and left them monopolists
subject largely to state control. Now the monopoly of intrastate calls
is to be taken from them and they are to be given a role in competing
in each other's markets or the market their predecessor company held.
The transition is no easy matter. Even the statute demonstrates some
ambivalence though it attempts at least to state that competition, and
not regulation, is the desired means of accomplishing their integration.
Professor Sullivan argues persuasively that allowing them a role in the
competition for interexchange service would threaten that competi-
tion.87 The Act itself provides many safeguards. (Section 272(a) re-
quires that, if a Baby Bell is to keep its local service it may not
provide - directly or through an affiliate - any new interlata service
other than out-of-region services, manufacturing or alarm service.)88
If a Baby Bell wishes to provide any of the services mentioned, it
must do so through an affiliate.89 Further, the affiliate must keep sep-
arate books, have separate officers and employees, and maintain arm's
82. lId at 67-68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)).
83. lad at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(f).
84. ld at 71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)).
85. See id at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(g)).
86. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
87. Sullivan, supra note 12.
88. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C § 272(a)).
89. Id at 93 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)).
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length relations (which are reduced to writings kept open for public
inspection) with the Bell Company.90 An affiliate may not obtain
credit in a manner that allows the creditor to have recourse to the Bell
Company in the event of default.91 This appears to mean that the af-
filiate can gain no advantage in the capital market from their affilia-
tion. An affiliate may not restrict sales of telecommunications
equipment, "including software integral to the operation of such
equipment and related upgrades," to any local exchange carrier. 92
Both the Bell Operating Company and any affiliate are required to
protect the proprietary information submitted with contract bids from
release not specifically authorized by the owner of such information. 93
BOCs and affiliates are allowed to collaborate with other manufactur-
ers only with respect to research and development.94
Finally, all dealings between the Bell Company and the affiliate
must be made on a nondiscriminatory basis, unbundled as much as is
feasible, and competitively useful information must be equally avail-
able to nonaffiliates. 9 In short, the Act tries to deprive the Bell Com-
pany of any integration advantage.
Professor Sullivan points to the fact that the BOCs are presently
monopolies protected by technological, economic, and regulatory bar-
riers.96 Although alternative forms of telephone exist, for example fi-
ber optic networks, they are limited to business-dense areas.
Similarly, cellular service remains an addition to basic service not a
substitute for it. Thus, local carriers, including the BOCs, have effec-
tive control of their markets. It is not clear to the writer, in this period
of exploding technological developments, that alternative forms of
communication will not soon be viable competition to telephone com-
munication. Further, Professor Sullivan argues, since the inter-
exchange market is presently highly competitive, the BOCs are not
needed to leaven that competition. 97
Professor Sullivan's concern about the BOCs acquisition of the
right to further expand lies in the use they could make of their present
90. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(5)).
91. Il at 92-93 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(4)).
92. Id. at 100 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273 (e)(4)).
93. l (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)).
94. Id at 95 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273(b)). This provision may be consistent with
antitrust law since it concerns research and development, a matter already exempted from some
antitrust provisions by an express amendment to the antitrust laws. National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1815 (1987). 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988) amended by National
Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306 (Supp. 1 1993).
95. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 93-94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)).
96. Sullivan, supra note 12.
97. Id.
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power both locally and in the interlata market. The types of problems
presented include cross-subsidization of interexchange services by
higher local prices and self-preference by the BOCs, especially if they
enter manufacturing of equipment (an endeavor presently prohibited).
Such problems, he suggests are not subject to effective regulatory
oversight. Both in terms of limited resources and because records do
not easily reveal subsidies and self-preference, he doubts that regula-
tors can keep the growing Operating Companies in check.
One might argue that the Bell Operating Companies individually
lack market power in the national interexchange market. Professor
Sullivan responds that each is large in its region and that the opportu-
nities for self-preference and cross-subsidization in those areas are of
independent significance and are also difficult to detect.98 Further, if
one succeeded, others would likely follow the example.
It is not clear that the Operating Companies will remain small in
the new market. Bell Atlantic and Nynex are discussing merger.99 If
they merged, the size of the combined company would be second only
to AT&T, its former parent.' 0 It would control Nynex's six states,
including New York, and Atlantic's mid-Atlantic area, including New
Jersey and Washington, D.C.' According to the Wall Street Journal,
about one-third of all domestic calls originate or end in that, combined
area. 1
02
Professor Sullivan argues most persuasively when he recalls that
the history of AT&T immediately before the divestiture decree illus-
trates precisely the kinds of problems he fears from the Baby Bells.
AT&T, faced with the FCC's efforts to open the communications mar-
ket to competitors, could no longer count on being able to appropriate
all the returns from its research and development investments. While
that state of development increased the research and development ef-
forts of competitive companies, the real burst of positive innovative
efforts awaited divestiture. Professor Sullivan explains the events as
freeing competitors of their ambivalence about their own ability and
competitive pressure to innovate to supply the BOCs (themselves pre-
cluded from manufacturing). AT&T no longer had a bottleneck mo-
nopoly of access to telephone lines.
History may, in this regard, be more persuasive than economic
theory. While he arrives at a quite plausible economic theory to ex-
98. Il
99. Leslie Cauley, Bell Atlantic and Nynex Discuss Merger to Form Second-Biggest Phone
Firm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1995, at A3.
100. Id
101. Id.
102. Id
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plain the lack of innovation of telecommunications competitors - they
were uncertain whether AT&T could block the products of their inno-
vation with its bottleneck - Professor Sullivan apparently does not
consider the possibility that the size and power of AT&T, divorced
from its control of telephone lines, might itself have provided a suffi-
cient disincentive.
It has become customary to accept classical economic analysis as
correctly describing such relationships. The author wonders whether
such theory is adequate to encompass all important factors in such
large reorganizations as are occurring in the telecommunications in-
dustry. Most importantly, one should wonder whether antitrust is ade-
quate to the task of making the Act function. Perhaps an independent
reason supporting Professor Sullivan's conclusion concerning the
BOCs is that large size such as the size of the Baby Bells may stifle
the utility of antitrust to help achieve a truly efficient market.
IV. Is THERE IMPLIED ANTITRUST IMMUNITY IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS Acr?
Whether it is adequate to the task or not, antitrust is a selected
medium of correction in the Act. Section 601(b) indicates that anti-
trust is a key factor in assuring appropriate telecommunications. 10 3
Several preliminary questions about its utility and application suggest
themselves. How does the antitrust application relate to the numerous
forms of regulatory exception to the law? Is a state, in applying its
regulatory functions, directly or indirectly subject to the antitrust law?
If a state is not itself subject to antitrust law, may it in its regulatory
functions immunize private actors for what would otherwise constitute
antitrust violations?
A. Implied Immunity
Although, by folklore, antitrust has achieved an exalted position
in the minds of many, antitrust law is merely statutory; there is no
reason for courts to disapprove its limitation by Congress. While
Congress can simply exempt a field from antitrust as it did with la-
bor, 104 it generally provides for immunity under limited circumstances
and only in the context of prescribed, usually regulatory procedures.
There are some instances in which a statute makes the relationship
clear by providing antitrust immunity to the regulators and their regu-
latory decisions. Such exculpating provisions exist, for example, in
103. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 143 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) and
amending 15 U.S.C. § 18).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1914).
1996]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
the Interstate Commerce Commission Act,1"' the Federal Communica-
tions Commission Act," 6 and the Shipping Act of 1984.107 There are
laws that by their silence on the subject allow courts to surmise the
intention to prefer regulation to antitrust; when the courts find that
intention, the regulators are said to have implied immunity.108
The Telecommunications Act has a provision that addresses the
relationship of the Act to antitrust and certainly forecloses express im-
munity but it may not be dispositive of the implied immunity question.
Section 601(b) provides, with exceptions not here relevant: "nothing
in this Act or the Amendments made by this Act shall be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust
laws."'1 9 This provision can be read as providing against implied im-
munity. (The author, on the other hand, would have thought that when
implied immunity was found, it would be construed not to modify,
impair, or supersede antitrust laws but rather that Congress intended
an approved procedure that did not warrant antitrust challenge.) In
fact, even if the issue of implied modification is not resolved by stat-
ute, it seems easily resolved on the merits.
Even when AT&T had a national monopoly of phone service
there were no express provisions of immunity for the FCC that would
apply to the telephone industry. Arguments for the industry's implied
immunity were nonetheless made, based on the comprehensive system
of governmental regulation pertaining to telephone service. In United
States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 10 Judge Greene ad-
dressed the issue of whether the telephone company was immune from
antitrust law based on the regulated status of the industry. He held
that immunity could not be implied from such regulation.' Judge
105. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West Supp. 1995).
106. 47 U.S.C.A. § 212 (West Supp. 1995).
107. 46 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
108. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
109. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 143 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) and
amending 15 U.S.C. § 18)).
110. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (the deci-
sion that began the line of cases leading to the partially competitive United States' telephone
system as it existed before the Telecommunications Act).
111. Judge Greene's rationale in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. is precise. He
states that:
The problem created by the tension between their antitrust laws and eco-
nomic regulation has been long recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); 2 A. KAHN, THE EcoNoMics
OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1, 4-5 (1971). Broadly speaking
the antitrust laws are rooted in the proposition that the public interest is best pro-
tected by competition, free from artificial restraints such as price-fixing and mo-
nopoly. The theory of regulation, on the other hand, presupposes that with respect
to certain areas of economic activity the judgment of expert agencies may produce
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Greene's analysis concerning the rareness of implied immunity is ex-
cellent. A perusal of cases makes that quite clear. 112 His attempted
hornbook statement of instances in which immunity will be implied is
impressive but not predictive of actual results. 113 His conclusion that
the provision of telephone service did not warrant implied antitrust
immunity seems settled by history. Not only did Judge Greene's opin-
ion remain unappealed, but he also became the virtual director of the
reorganized industry in administering the consent decree entered after
his decision. He has continued to be the one judge in the federal sys-
tem who has dealt with the industry day after day for a generation.
The claim that antitrust immunity applies appears to have ended with
his denial. If the immunity argument was of no avail in the previous
era of much greater regulation, the argument seems clearly not appli-
results superior to those of the marketplace, and that for this reason competition in
a particular industry will not necessarily serve the public interest. Because of
these divergent objectives, it could be, and has been, argued that whenever the
Congress has established a scheme of regulation through an independent commis-
sion, it must be deemed to have determined that the antitrust laws should not
apply to the industry thus being regulated. That, however, is not the law.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that, "repeals of the antitrust laws
by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only
been found in cases of plain repugancy between the antitrust and regulatory pro-
visions." Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973), quot-
ing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
Regulated industries "are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act" (Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945)), and they are not necessarily
exempt even if the conduct complained of in an antitrust context has been ex-
pressly approved by the agency charged with the regulation of the particular
industry.
Regulated conduct is, however, deemed to be immune by implication from
the antitrust law in two relatively narrow instances: (1) when a regulator agency
has, with congressional approval, exercised explicit authority over the challenged
practice itself (as distinguished from the general subject matter) in such a way that
antitrust enforcement would interfere with regulation and (2) when regulation by
an agency over an industry or some of its components or practices is so pervasive
that Congress is assumed to have determined competition to be an inadequate
means of vindicating the public interest.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (cita-
tions omitted) (foomotes omitted).
112. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986); Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound
Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
113. It is difficult to see why the Federal Power Commission cases do not qualify for immu-
nity on both criteria. The results are otherwise. See California v. Federal Power Comm'n and
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Even more difficult to explain is
why immunity would be implied for private actors under the Securities and Exchange Act ac-
cording to dictum in Silver v. N. Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). A more accurate state-
ment would be that the few cases in which immunity is implied are sui generis and extremely
infrequent.
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cable after the new Act which applies regulatory measures far more
sparsely.
Having concluded that the antitrust laws survive an attack based
on the statute's having provided immunity, there remains the question
of which law takes precedence in the event of a dispute. If the Justice
Department disagrees with an FCC interpretation of the law, believing
that what the commission would permit would violate antitrust law,
may it bring suit against the conduct under the antitrust principles? 1 4
While the Act announces the primacy of antitrust, it still seems un-
clear what result to expect of this provision. Consider the Public Utili-
ties Commission's authority to supervise natural gas company
interconnection. What if a private antitrust suit precedes regulatory
permission? In the natural gas case, the Supreme Court indicated that
antitrust prevailed." 5 Indeed, the Justice Department did not even
have to allow the commission to express its expert opinion.
B. State Action Immunity for Antitrust
Aside from the question of how the regulatory role of the Federal
Communications Commission is to be resolved with the antitrust laws,
there remains a similar question with respect to state provided immu-
nity from antitrust. Curiously, federal courts have created a state right
to accomplish an immunity not authorized by federal statutes for acts
federal courts think ought to be resolved through state regulation
rather than the application of competition rules. Since the United
States Constitution provides for state adherence to federal legislation
under the Supremacy Clause, 116 one might suppose that state attempts
to block the application of federal antitrust law would be declared
void. There is certainly no affirmative federal constitutional right that
could easily explain a state's ability to deny congressional legislation
114. There is one instance in which the statute begins to resolve this question. Before a
BOC may enter interexchange service it must pass an FCC checklist for competitiveness in
relation to local competitors. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 88 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)). In applying that checklist, the FCC is directed to give "substantial
weight" to the opinion of the Justice Department. Id. at 89 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(2)). Even that provision does not settle who has priority in resolving a disagreement.
In another instance, the Act provides that BOCs should engage in network planning with others
"consistent with the antitrust laws." Id. at 99 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273(e)(3)). Does
that provision imply that the Justice Department can sue if it disagrees with the FCC that the
required planning was consistent? May a court decide that an antitrust suit (as opposed to an
administrative hearing) is a preferred manner of determining what is "consistent with the anti-
trust laws?" What is the effect of this section on others which do not expressly invoke antitrust
consistency, given the several references indicating that the entire Act is to be read consistently
with the antitrust laws?
1.15. California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
116. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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in this area. The Sherman Act" 7 was declared a valid application of
congressional power under the commerce clause 18 at a time when
manufacturing was still thought to be outside Congressional oversight
because it was local.1"' The Tenth Amendment, the only other appar-
ent basis for state constitutional authority over commerce, while lifted
from its near total rejection by the Supreme Court,120 is clearly far too
limited to support so broad a role.121
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has found a state
right that blocks federal antitrust enforcement. States are themselves
immune from antitrust law.1 22 That result can be attributed to the fact
that Congress appeared to have no interest in regulating the states'
conduct by the acts. Beyond their own immunity, however, states can
also immunize private actors and local government from antitrust ap-
plication."Z The Court has not always been so generous to state au-
thority, however. In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.,' 24 the Court denied the state the right to enforce nonsigner fair
trade prices, 21 The decision might be characterized as evidencing in-
sufficient supervision of the price as in California Retail Liquor Deal-
ers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.. 26 It might also be
characterized as evidencing an insufficient state interest in the interfer-
ence with interstate commerce inherent in allowing fair trade restric-
tions on pricing freedom without most customers' agreement.' 27 The
ample indications in the Act that it does not invalidate, supersede or
modify antitrust law may be no more dispositive relative to the states
than they were with respect to the FCC. It is important to recall the
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890) (amended 1990).
118. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
119. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
120. In the period of reconsideration, following President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in
1936, the Court, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), had declared the amend-
ment a mere truism that anything not delegated to Congress was not surrendered.
121. The amendment was revived in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), but that brief reinstatement was again cancelled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), a concept of protect-
ing states rights was used as a basis for interpreting national legislation.
122. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
123. Id.
124. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
125. Id.
126. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
127. One might wonder whether there is a limit on state granted antitrust immunity in the
nature of the constitutional limits on burdening interstate commerce. In that regard, consider the
Court's recent insistence that, like implied immunity stemming from federal regulatory statutes,
state authority to grant immunity is not lightly to be inferred. See Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992). This issue is beyond the scope of this article.
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extent to which federal courts have created state action immunity as
one considers the new state role in implementing the Act.
C. Local Governments and Individuals are Not Immune
Although state governments are immune and can immunize
others from antitrust, local government units are not immune and, of
course, cannot grant immunity. 128 As a result, if local governments
violate antitrust provisions, they are liable, and those outside govern-
ment who participated in creating the offense are also liable in anti-
trust. Private parties not acting at state direction are subject to the
usual remedies in antitrust. They can be criminally prosecuted by the
Department of Justice. 29 They can be held liable for civil penalties
by the federal government, 130 and they may be subject to administra-
tive proceedings by the Federal Trade Commission, whose antitrust
jurisdiction largely overlaps that of the Department of Justice.' 3' Lo-
cal Governmental units themselves, those acting at their direction, and
employees acting in their official capacities are not subject to penalties
because of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,132 but are
still subject to injunctive relief under the Sherman Act.' 33
Not all state laws that appear to allow municipalities to commit
antitrust offenses provide immunity. To immunize, state law must be
affirmatively expressed and clearly articulated. 34 Local government
was once required to prove that the state supervised its activity135 but
now appears relieved of that duty.1 36 The two remaining require-
ments, of affirmative expression and clear articulation, are still in the
process of definition. For example, when a power utility's rate sched-
ule indicated it would replace light bulbs free of charge to its custom-
ers, the fact that the state had mandated the free light bulb distribution
was unpersuasive. The Court held that the utility had originated the
128. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (amended 1990).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1955) (amended 1990).
131. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1914) (amended 1936); 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976) (amended
1989).
132. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), 15 U.S.C. §§ 34 -36
(1984).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890) (amended 1996).
134. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
135. Id
136. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
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idea and the state merely acquiesced. 37 In California Retail Liquor
Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,138 the Supreme Court struck
down California's wine licensing law. The state required by its provi-
sions 139 that either the seller of wine set a schedule of prices or that a
fair trade contract be made with any wholesaler. Either provision
would establish the ,only authorized retail price for the wine. Finding
that the state did not actively supervise the price setting, i.e., it left
price setting to private parties, the Court held that the state action doc-
trine did not apply."' °
Municipalities have been found guilty of antitrust violations in
recent years. Perhaps closest to issues that might be raised under local
telephone deregulation, the City of Boulder enacted an emergency or-
dinance prohibiting expansion of cable television service.'
41
Although the city had a home rule status in the state, which allowed
the city to enact most statutes open to enactment by the state, the
Court held the city to answer antitrust complaints. The Court found
that the home rule provision was, at best, mere permission to enact the
ordinance in question;1 42 it fell far short of clear articulation and af-
firmative expression.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' 43 the
Supreme Court upheld an antitrust claim for tying. The city required
those on the outskirts of the city to purchase electricity from the city's
utility as a condition to being continued as customers of the city's
water and gas."4 The court found that there was not enough indica-
137. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). One must wonder, in any event,
whether a state would be allowed more affirmatively to establish a monopoly in light bulb supply
given the dearth of state regulatory need to control bulb distribution.
138. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
139. CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE §§ 24862-24866 (West Supp. 1980).
140. Midcal, 445 U.S. 97 at 105. The Court has not been entirely clear on its definition of
active supervision. In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48 (1985), it accepted routine approval, without additional review by the state, as adequate su-
pervision of rates jointly set by carriers. In a later case, however, the decision was ascribed to a
procedural fluke; Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in FTC v. Ticor Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621
(1992), indicated that the Court had rejected the defense on the grounds that the policy was not
affirmatively articulated, and so spent little time concerning itself with the supervision point. In
324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987), the Court refused state enforcement of a re-
quirement that prices be at least 112 percent of posted wholesale prices as enough when there
was no supervision of the setting of wholesale prices. In Patrick v. Budget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988)
the Court also rejected supervision of hospital peer review procedures when the state only
demonstrated that it monitored proceedings in which peer review of hospital procedures was
involved and the state did not show equal review of private peer review proceedings.
141. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
142. Id. at 56.
143. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
144. Id
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tion that the state had considered the anticompetitive stance of the city
and approved it."a But in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,146 the
Supreme Court held a city immunized from antitrust laws even though
the city acquired of a monopoly sewage treatment plant and required
those customers who wanted to tie their systems to the plant to
purchase the city's sewage collection and transportation services. 47
The Court found a provision in the Wisconsin statutes that the Court
read expressly to allow the sort of activity in which the city en-
gaged. 48 The competing services of neighboring towns were conse-
quently barred from relief.14 9
If a local government is authorized to act in a manner inconsis-
tent with the antitrust laws, within the meaning of Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire antitrust immunity does not depend on whether the
city acts wisely or imprudently. Even if it appears that the city might
have acted corruptly to enhance the interests of private parties rather
then the interests of the city, immunity will not be compromised. The
Supreme Court has ruled that it will not allow such matters to be liti-
gated because the Court does not want federal courts embroiled in
examining the legislative motives of local governments. 150
The local franchising authority will first have to inquire whether
it has state authority to disregard the strict dictates of anti-merger
law. 15' In anti-merger cases, the FCC has authority to preempt a
state's conclusion. Assuming either the state or commission does
have such authority, the next question is whether the Justice Depart-
ment is able to invoke section 7 of the Clayton Act 5 2 despite the
approval.1 53 At least with respect to these merger-related issues, pri-
vate antitrust suits are unlikely, and only the Justice Department, the
FTC, and states applying their own antitrust law will have options to
pursue enforcement of antitrust.154
145. Id
146. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id
150. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914) (amended 1984).
153. Cf. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 86 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271).
154. Since merger provisions deal with concentration that poses an incipient threat to com-
petition, as opposed to a realized one, private parties usually fail in their efforts to prove their
own damage as is required by the private damages provision of section four of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 16.
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V. CONCLUSION
Not considered in this article is the ability of private parties to
bring antitrust suits for antitrust damages. While the Act provides its
own remedy for those injured by violation of antitrust, there is no indi-
cation that private antitrust suits are any more preempted than those by
the federal government or the states. Indeed, private enforcement is
traditionally described as simply an extension of governmental efforts
to ensure that the laws are followed.
There are many issues that might raise antitrust concerns under
the Act. Congress considered a number of them in the law itself
although, as indicated, Congress has not definitively answered them.
Consider § 652(e)(6)(iii) 155 which allows the Commission to waive
telephone-cable interchange size limitations if it finds that "the an-
ticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly out-
weighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served."' 56 This section allows a local franchising authority (in the
case of the purchase or acquisition of a cable operator or a joint ven-
ture to provide cable service) or a State Commission (in the case of the
acquisition of a local exchange carrier or a joint venture to provide
telephone exchange service) to approve or disapprove a purchase, ac-
quisition, or joint venture. 157 The local franchising authority will first
have to inquire whether it has state authority to disregard the strict
dictates of anti-merger law.' 5 ' Assuming it does have such authority,
the next question is whether the Justice Department will invoke sec-
tion seven of the Clayton Act despite the approval.' 59 The latter issue
will also apply to state approval. 160
Section 259161 provides that:
[T]he Commission shall prescribe, within one year after the date of
enactment of [this Act], regulations that require incumbent local
exchange carriers [mostly BOCs] to make available to any qualify-
ing carrier such public switched network infrastructure, technology,
information, and telecommunications facilities and functions as
may be requested by the such qualifying carrier for the purpose of
enabling such qualifying carrier to provide telecommunications
155. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §652
(d)(6)(a)(iii).
156. lit
157. Id at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(d)(6)).
158. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
161. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 77-78 (to be codified at 47 U.S..C. § 259).
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services, or to provide access to information services, in the service
area in which such qualifying carrier has requested and obtained
designation as an eligible telecommunications carrier.162
The Commission is also to ensure that the "local exchange carrier
makes such infrastructure, technology, information, facilities, or func-
tions available to a qualifying carrier on just and reasonable terms and
conditions that permit such qualifying carrier to fully benefit from the
economies of scale and scope of such local exchange carrier.' 63 If
efforts are made to avoid these outcomes, will antitrust be applicable?
The Commission is given authority to waive many requirements of the
Act on an appropriate finding. 64 In some instances, the Commission
is empowered to override inconsistent state decisions.' 65
In addition to the problems highlighted by the Act itself, there is
considerable room for antitrust violations. Considerable collaboration
is required in the Act, and more is authorized. Certainly there is room
for a claim of the various forms of restraints of trade prohibited by
section one of the Sherman Act. 166 There may be a proliferation of
agreements to fix prices, divide territories, boycott competitors, tie
products to services, and make exclusive dealing until a market grows
strong enough to make them infeasible. Monopolization claims, or at
least claims sounding in attempt to monopolize, seem likely. These
are the sorts of claims that antitrust would normally resolve in an un-
regulated market. It remains to be seen whether these issues can be
resolved appropriately, given the provisions of the new Act.
162. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, at 77-78 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 259(a)).
163. Il at 78 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 259(b)(4)).
164. See, e.g., id. at 64-65 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(0).
165. See, e.g., id. 70-71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(d)).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (amended 1990).
[Vol. 12
